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Market pricing of banks’ fair value assets reported
under SFAS 157 since the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis
Beng Wee Goh a, Dan Li b, Jeffrey Ng a,⇑, Kevin Ow Yong a
a Singapore Management University, Singapore
b Tsinghua University, China
a b s t r a c t
We investigate how investors price the fair value estimates of assets
as required by Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 157
(SFAS 157) since the ﬁnancial crisis in 2008.We observe that Level 3
fair value estimates are typically priced lower than Level 1 and Level
2 fair value estimates between 2008 and 2011. However, the differ-
ence between the pricing of the different estimates reduces over
time, suggesting that asmarket conditions stabilize in the aftermath
of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis, reliability concerns about Level 3 esti-
mates dissipated to some extent. Next, we examine whether Level
3 gains affect the pricing of Level 3 estimates because managers
have discretion to use Level 3 gains to manage earnings and asset
values upwards.We ﬁnd that differences in Level 3 gains do not lead
investors to price Level 3 estimates differently. Finally, we ﬁnd evi-
dence that the pricing of the Level 1 and Level 2 fair value estimates
of assets is lower for bankswith lower capital adequacy. Overall, our
study contributes to an improved understanding of the relation
between valuation and fair value information.
 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Fair value, deﬁned as the price that would be received for selling an asset or paid to transfer a
liability in an orderly transaction between market participants at the measurement date (SFAS
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157), can be derived from market prices (Level 1 estimates) or from models that use either market
inputs (Level 2 estimates) or internally generated inputs (Level 3 estimates).1 The disorderly market
conditions experienced in 2008 raised concerns about the reliability of fair value estimates. An important
study by Song et al. (2010) investigates investors’ pricing of the fair value estimates during the ﬁnancial
crisis in 2008. The authors ﬁnd that in the ﬁrst three quarters of 2008, investors priced Level 3 estimates
lower than they did for Level 1 and Level 2 estimates. These ﬁndings are consistent with investors’ con-
cerns that Level 3 estimates were less reliable because of inherent measurement error in estimating
these values or managerial incentives to inﬂate them.
In this paper, we ﬁrst extend Song et al. (2010) by examining how investors price the different fair
value estimates since the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis. We conduct this analysis because it is important to
understand how fair value estimates are perceived by investors when market conditions change
(Laux and Leuz, 2009, 2010). For example, while the stock market in the United States fell dramatically
from 2008 to March 2009, there has been a sharp reversal in recent years. According to the National
Bureau of Economic Research (NBER), the recession that started in December 2007 ended in June 2009
and the economy has been expanding since then, though economic conditions remain weak with high
unemployment rates.2 Perhaps more importantly, the FASB issued Accounting Standards Update (ASU)
No. 2010-06 Improving Disclosures about Fair Value Measurements in January 2010 and ASU No. 2011-04
Fair Value Measurement: Amendments to Achieve Common Fair Value Measurement and Disclosure Require-
ments in U.S. GAAP and IFRS in May 2011. These updates were issued in response to calls for more fair
value disclosures.3 Given these changing conditions, we argue that investors’ concerns about the reliabil-
ity of fair value estimates, particularly Level 3 estimates, might have evolved over time and it is therefore
important to examine the pricing of fair value estimates in the aftermath of the ﬁnancial crisis.
Consistent with Song et al. (2010), we regress stock prices on the three levels of fair value assets,
where pricing, as reﬂected by a signiﬁcant positive coefﬁcient on the fair value asset variable in the
pricing regressions, refers to the ability of the fair value asset amounts to reﬂect information that is
useful to investors. In the empirical analyses, we rely on the fair value estimates provided by banks
in their 10-K ﬁlings between 2008 and 2011 to examine how the market pricing of the fair value esti-
mates based on the fair value hierarchy changes over this time period.
Our empirical results show that investors price each dollar of Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 assets at
$1.02, $0.96, and $0.87, respectively, during our sample period from 2008 to 2011. Consistent with the
pattern documented in Song et al. (2010), these results suggest that investors discount the market
pricing of fair values as the reliability of the reported fair value estimates decreases across the
three-level fair value hierarchy. More interestingly, we observe that investors discount the reported
fair value estimates to varying degrees across all three levels of the fair value hierarchy during and
after the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis.
Speciﬁcally, the market pricing of Level 1 (Level 2, Level 3) assets is $0.96 ($0.85, $0.79) for ﬁrms
that reported these fair value estimates in ﬁscal year 2008.4 However, there is a marked improvement
with regard to how investors perceive these fair value estimates as market conditions stabilize. The mar-
ket pricing for Level 1 estimates is $1.07 ($1.04, $1.00) for ﬁscal year 2009 (2010, 2011). Likewise, the
market pricing for Level 2 estimates improves to $0.96 ($1.00, $0.95) for ﬁscal year 2009 (2010, 2011)
respectively. Similarly, the market pricing for Level 3 estimates improves to $0.85 ($0.88, $0.88) for ﬁscal
1 SFAS 157 stipulates the disclosure of fair value hierarchy information as a footnote disclosure. The disclosure of the fair value
hierarchy provides information about how much of a ﬁrm’s assets and liabilities are valued based on: (1) market prices directly
(Level 1 inputs), (2) other observable market-based inputs (Level 2 inputs), or (3) ﬁrm-supplied unobservable inputs (Level 3
inputs). Prior to SFAS 157 adoption, these fair value measurements were not disclosed to market participants.
2 source: http://www.nber.org/cycles/cyclesmain.html.
3 SFAS 157 is classiﬁed as Accounting Standards Codiﬁcation (ASC) 820 in the updated FASB Codiﬁcation. Both ASU No. 2010-06
and ASU No. 2011-04 signiﬁcantly expand ASC 820’s existing disclosure requirements on fair value measurements, especially in
relation to disclosures regarding Level 3 measurements.
4 Our market pricing results for 2008 differ slightly from the reported results shown in Song et al. (2010). Speciﬁcally, the
valuation coefﬁcient for Level 1 estimates ($0.968) in their paper is similar to ours but they document different valuation
coefﬁcients for Level 2 estimates ($0.972) and Level 3 estimates ($0.683). However, we note that their tests are based on the ﬁrst
three quarters of 2008.
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year 2009 (2010, 2011) respectively. A key result is that there is no longer a statistically signiﬁcant dif-
ference between investors’ pricing of Level 3 estimates and the other estimates in 2011.
Next, we perform some cross-sectional analyses of the pricing of the fair value estimates. An inter-
esting feature of SFAS 157 is that there are asymmetric disclosure requirements for the different esti-
mates in the fair value hierarchy. In particular, for Level 3 assets and liabilities only, the ﬁrm is
required to disclose: (i) total gains or losses for the period, (ii) purchase, sales, issues, and settlements,
and (iii) the amounts of any transfers into or out of Level 3 of the fair value hierarchy, the reasons for
those transfers, and the policy for determining when transfers between levels are deemed to have
occurred.
Given the discretion that managers have over Level 3 estimates, Level 3 gains might reﬂect
attempts by managers to use Level 3 estimation to inﬂate earnings and asset values. As such attempts
could exacerbate reliability concerns about Level 3 estimates, we examine how such gains and losses
affect investors’ pricing of Level 3 estimates. Our analyses suggest that the magnitude of fair value
gains and losses do not lead investors to price Level 3 estimates differently. As noted earlier, the dis-
counting of Level 3 estimates could be due to inherent measurement error in estimating these values
or to managerial incentives to inﬂate them. One possible inference is that the former is more likely to
be the reason for the investors’ discounting of Level 3 estimates.
Finally, we examine the role of capital adequacy in inﬂuencing investors’ assessments of banks’
reported fair value estimates. Investors’ pricing of these fair value estimates might vary if the extent
of capital adequacy affects the ability of banks to sell their assets in an orderly manner. A major con-
cern with respect to fair value accounting is its pro-cyclicality aspect. For example, Allen and Carletti
(2008) and Plantin et al. (2008) analytically show that fair value estimates can be affected by factors
other than assets’ fundamentals, especially in times when asset markets are illiquid and ﬁrms are dis-
tressed. We conjecture that banks with higher capital adequacy ratios are in a stronger ﬁnancial posi-
tion; that is, they are more likely to be able to hold their assets to maturity and not have to sell them in
disorderly markets at unfavorable prices.
We ﬁnd evidence that Level 1 and Level 2 fair value estimates are priced higher by investors for
banks with capital adequacy above the median bank. Said differently, investors apply a valuation dis-
count to the reported fair value estimates of the Level 1 and Level 2 assets of banks with low capital
adequacy ratios. The incremental effect is economically signiﬁcant and suggests that investors are
concerned that banks with low capital adequacy might resort to a ﬁre sale of these relatively more
liquid assets. These results are consistent with the idea documented by Allen and Carletti (2008)
and Plantin et al. (2008) that investors perceive asset prices differently in times of ﬁnancial crises
and that liquidity concerns are one factor driving investors’ pricing of the fair value reported by the
banks. Unlike the market pricing of Level 1 and 2 assets, the pricing of Level 3 assets is not affected
by cross-sectional variation in ﬁrms’ capital adequacy ratios. Given that Level 3 assets are relatively
less liquid than Level 1 and Level 2 assets, one possible reason for this result is that in a disorderly
market, banks are more likely to engage in ﬁre sales of their more liquid assets to raise additional
capital.
Our study contributes to the literature on the capital market consequences of fair value accounting
(e.g., Kolev, 2009; Song et al., 2010; Riedl and Serafeim, 2011; Bowen and Khan, 2014). We extend
Song et al. (2010) by examining the cross-sectional and time-series variations in the pricing of fair
value estimates since the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis. For our time-series analyses, we show that there is less
discounting by investors of banks’ fair value assets, particularly Level 3 assets, as the ﬁnancial crisis
abated after 2008. This is an important ﬁnding because it suggests that at least some of relatively lar-
ger discounting of Level 3 assets might simply be an artifact of negative macroeconomic conditions
and uncertainty about the implementation of SFAS 157, as opposed to concerns about managerial
upward manipulation of fair value estimates. For our cross-sectional analyses, we examine how the
pricing of estimates varies conditionally on the reported Level 3 fair value gains and losses and differ-
ences in ﬁrms’ capital adequacy. The lack of evidence that Level 3 gains and losses affect the pricing of
Level 3 estimates adds further credence that upward manipulation might not be driving the discount-
ing of the Level 3 estimates. Our ﬁnding that the pricing of fair value estimates is higher with higher
capital adequacy suggests that liquidity is one factor that drives investors’ pricing of the fair value
reported by the banks.
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In Section 2, we discuss related literature and develop our hypotheses. Section 3 describes our sam-
ple, while Section 4 details our research methodology and test results. Section 5 concludes.
2. Hypothesis development
2.1. The fair value hierarchy hypothesis
The Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) introduced Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 157, Fair Value Measurements (SFAS 157), to provide a consistent framework for measur-
ing fair value. Under this standard, ﬁrms are required to provide additional disclosures about their fair
value measurements via the reporting of a three-level fair value hierarchy (see Appendix A). The hier-
archy is based on the type of inputs applied (the data used) to measure fair value: Level 1 inputs are
quoted prices in active markets; Level 2 inputs are data adjusted from similar items traded in active
markets, or from identical or similar items in markets that are not active; and Level 3 inputs are unob-
servable and generated by the entity itself. This information allows investors to identify the nature
and amounts of the fair value assets that ﬁrms have, and the valuation methods that they use in arriv-
ing at their reported fair value estimates.
A key feature of the fair value hierarchy is that it prioritizes the inputs used to measure fair values.
Speciﬁcally, the standard requires preparers to give the highest priority to quoted prices (unadjusted)
in active markets (Level 1) and the lowest priority to unobservable inputs (Level 3) in the measure-
ment of fair values. The rationale for such an ordering is based on standard setters’ beliefs that quoted
prices in an active market provide the most reliable evidence of fair value. Hence, such prices are to be
used as valuation inputs to measure fair value whenever available.
SFAS 157 became effective for ﬁnancial statements issued for ﬁscal years beginning after November
15, 2007. The timing of the adoption of this accounting standard coincided with the 2008 ﬁnancial cri-
sis. The 2008 ﬁnancial crisis is characterized by many economists as arguably the worst ﬁnancial crisis
since the Great Depression of the 1930s.5 Market conditions were extremely disorderly during this per-
iod. The VIX index, a popular measure of the implied volatility of S&P500 index options, reached an all-
time high of 89.53 on October 24, 2008 whereas the average value of VIX was 19.04 between 1990 and
2008. The crisis was also notable for its impact on the banking industry (e.g., Akins et al., 2004; Krishnan
and Zhang, 2014; Ng and Roychowdhury, 2014). As an indication, the TED spread, measured as the dif-
ference between the interest rates on interbank loans and short-term government debt, reached an all
high-time high of 457 basis points on October 10, 2008. In contrast, the long-term average of the TED
spread is around 30–50 basis points. An increase in the TED spread indicates that there is heightened risk
of default on interbank loans in the ﬁnancial sector.
Our ﬁrst hypothesis deals with whether there are variations in the pricing of fair value assets
across the different levels of the fair value hierarchy during the ﬁnancial crisis and afterwards. Fun-
damental economic principles provide a rationale for requiring ﬁnancial institutions to use fair val-
uation for ﬁnancial reporting (e.g., Heaton et al., 2010). In practice, there are a variety of practical
difﬁculties in implementing fair value accounting even under the best market conditions (e.g.,
Benston, 2008). Thus, we examine whether there is signiﬁcant variation regarding how investors
price ﬁrms’ reported fair value estimates across different periods. Whether investors price fair value
estimates differently in disorderly markets as opposed to relatively more stable market conditions is
an important question that has not been previously examined, particularly with respect to Level 3
fair value estimates.
Our ﬁrst hypothesis (in null form) is:
H1: Investors’ pricing of Levels 1, 2, and 3 asset estimates is the same across different market
conditions.
5 Federal Reserve Chairman Ben Bernanke called it ‘‘the worst ﬁnancial crisis in modern history’’. His predecessor, Alan
Greenspan, said it was ‘‘the most virulent global ﬁnancial crisis ever’’ (Wessel, 2010).
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2.2. The Level 3 gains and losses hypothesis
Level 3 inputs are unobservable, ﬁrm-supplied estimates. These inputs are considered difﬁcult to
estimate and largely unrestrained by market discipline. Hence, market participants tend to be more
cautious about Level 3 valuations. For example, Riedl and Serafeim (2011) ﬁnd that Level 3 measure-
ments contain higher information risk than Level 1 and Level 2 measurements. For these reasons, stan-
dard setters require ﬁrms to provide more detailed disclosures for Level 3 than for other fair value
measurements. However, it is unclear whether the disclosures for Level 3 measurements stipulated
in SFAS 157 are adequate to satisfy market participants (e.g., Ryan, 2008).
Prior research documents that managers have incentives to bias non-market-based valuation
inputs to manipulate fair value measurements for opportunistic reasons. For example, Aboody et al.
(2006) ﬁnd evidence that ﬁrms manipulate employee stock options’ model inputs for earnings man-
agement purposes.6 Benston (2006) asserts that fair value estimates are easily manipulated in the
absence of an actively traded market. Speciﬁcally, he describes how the fair value estimates of certain
ﬁnancial instruments are based on traders’ own estimates using their own valuation models and esti-
mates of forward price curves, and that the valuations of these assets are easily manipulated by tweaking
the assumptions that the computer models use to value them.
Since fair value accounting revolves around the recognition of changes in fair value estimates, it is
interesting to assess how investors will view the pricing of Level 3 assets when ﬁrms report substan-
tial Level 3 gains and losses. Ryan (2008; p. 1628) contends that reported Level 3 measurements are
‘‘very difﬁcult to interpret for a given ﬁrm and to compare across ﬁrms’’ in the absence of quantitative
disclosures of Level 3 inputs or the sensitivities of fair value measurements to those inputs. Benston
(2008; p. 106) predicts that dishonest and opportunistic managers will ﬁnd fair value accounting ‘‘a
boon to their efforts to manipulate reported net income’’. In addition, prior research suggests that
auditors face signiﬁcant challenges trying to verify hard-to-estimate fair value measurements, given
that Level 3 gains and losses are based on valuation techniques that incorporate inputs and outcomes
that cannot be directly veriﬁed (e.g., Martin et al., 2006).7 For these reasons, we posit our second
hypothesis (in alternative form) as follows:
H2: Level 3 gains reduce investors’ pricing of Level 3 asset estimates.
2.3. The capital adequacy hypothesis
The fair value of an asset is based on the price that would be received when the asset is sold in an
orderly fashion. However, the markets for many assets may become disorderly in times of ﬁnancial
crisis as the liquidity for these assets becomes scarce. Allen and Carletti (2008) show that prices reﬂect
the cash available to buyers in imperfect markets with scarce liquidity. This situation leads to excess
price volatility, resulting in low prices during crisis periods when many assets are on sale (‘‘ﬁre sales’’).
With fair value accounting, the price level could directly affect the value of banks’ assets and can cause
unnecessary failures and contagion.
Banks with lower capital adequacy are more likely to have to raise capital, especially if there is a
possibility of bank failure and/or a threat of intervention by regulators. Such banks are consequently
more likely to be forced to liquidate their positions, even if these assets are sold at ﬁre-sale prices.
Hence, we conjecture that differences in banks’ capital adequacy will result in cross-sectional varia-
tion in the pricing of their assets to the extent that banks can sell these instruments in an orderly fash-
ion. That is, investors are more likely to discount the fair value of those bank assets that face a greater
likelihood of a forced sale due to concerns that these assets might be liquidated at unfavorable prices.
Evidence that investors price fair value assets higher when there is greater capital adequacy provides
6 The fair value estimates of employee stock options are based on internal valuation models that rely on ﬁrm-supplied valuation
inputs because quoted prices for employee stock options are typically not available due to the non-tradability provisions of these
options.
7 Benston (2008) provides several examples showing that fair values other than those based on quoted prices could be readily
manipulated by opportunistic managers and that these estimates are very difﬁcult for auditors to verify and challenge.
B.W. Goh et al. / J. Account. Public Policy 34 (2015) 129–145 133
support for the argument that liquidity concerns are one factor driving investors’ pricing of the fair
value reported by the banks (Allen and Carletti, 2008; Plantin et al., 2008). Hence, our third hypothesis,
which focuses on the issue of asset liquidity, is:
H3: Investors’ pricing of fair value assets is higher for banks with higher capital adequacy.
3. Sample construction and descriptive statistics
3.1. Sample selection
We obtain ﬁnancial variables and ﬁling dates from Compustat, and share prices from CRSP. For
information on the SFAS 157 hierarchy, we obtain data on Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 fair value assets
(Compustat: AQPL1, AOL2, and AUL3) and Level 1, Level 2 and Level 3 fair value liabilities (Compustat:
LQPL1, LOL2, and LUL3) from the Compustat database. We hand-collect data on Level 3 gains from the
footnote disclosures in ﬁrms’ Form 10-K ﬁlings as ﬁrms are required to disclose these amounts under
the expanded disclosure requirements stipulated in SFAS 157.
To construct our sample, we ﬁrst obtain all banks on Compustat Quarterly with ﬁscal quarter end
dates in 2008–2011, as deﬁned in Standard & Poor’s Global Industry Classiﬁcation Standard (GICS)
Industry Groups 4010 or 4020. This gives us an initial sample of 16,097 observations. We include
diversiﬁed ﬁnancials (GICS code 4020) in our sample because GICS code 4010 includes only traditional
banks (e.g., commercial banks and thrifts) and many other important types of banks (e.g., investment
banks and credit institutions) are classiﬁed as diversiﬁed ﬁnancials. Of these there are 7738 observa-
tions with ordinary shares listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ at the ﬁling date (available from CRSP)
and for which Form 10-Q/10-K ﬁling dates are available. We retain all banks for which Form 10-Q/10-
K ﬁling dates are available because we are using the price immediately after the 10-Q ﬁling date to
examine the pricing of banks’ assets. We retain 7283 observations that have market capitalization
information and other non-missing data after the ﬁling date. Consistent with Song et al. (2010), we
further eliminate 390 observations for which the studentized residuals are greater than 2 in our
regression estimation. We use these 6893 observations for our main tests and for the conditional anal-
yses of capital adequacy. Panel A of Table 1 summarizes the sample selection procedure.
Table 1, Panel B shows the sample composition by exchange listing. We note that the majority of
our observations come from banks listed on NASDAQ, which is not surprising because of the signiﬁ-
cant number of relatively small regional banks and depository institutions listed on NASDAQ in the
United States. Panel C shows the sample composition by industry classiﬁcation, which follows the
Standard & Poor’s Global Industry Classiﬁcation Standard. Most of the observations in our sample
are from commercial banks (64.0%) and thrifts and mortgage ﬁnance companies (17.0%). Although
commercial banks comprise a signiﬁcant proportion of our sample, their market capitalization is sig-
niﬁcantly smaller than those of the diversiﬁed ﬁnancials. The mean (median) market capitalization of
the traditional banksgroup in our sample is $1.19 billion ($0.13 billion). In contrast, the mean (med-
ian) market capitalization of the diversiﬁed ﬁnancials group is $8.08 billion ($0.62 billion). Panel D of
Table 1 shows the number of unique banks in each sample year. From 2008 to 2011, we have
477,464,459, and 445 unique banks respectively.
3.2. Descriptive statistics
Table 2, Panel A provides the descriptive statistics on the magnitude of the fair value assets and
liabilities for our sample ﬁrms. All variables are on a per share basis.8 The mean share price (PRICE)
is 13.25. We report the gross Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 assets and liabilities. The mean fair value assets
8 Given that our paper focuses on extending Song et al. (2010), we follow their empirical design by using the number of
outstanding shares as the scaler. Following the suggestion of the referee, we also tried using total assets as the scaler but we were
unable to document the monotonic decrease in the pricing of different levels of fair value assets. As noted by Easton (1998),
because management may change the number of outstanding shares without changing the economic characteristics of the ﬁrm,
some caution is warranted in interpreting results with number of outstanding shares as the scaler.
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using Level 1 valuation inputs (FVA1), Level 2 inputs (FVA2), and Level 3 inputs (FVA3) are 3.09, 26.93, and
3.60, respectively. Panel B of Table 2 provides descriptive statistics for the relative size of fair value assets
and liabilities for our sample ﬁrms. In terms of relative size, Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 fair value assets
constitute 2.41%, 15.93% and 3.97% of the total assets of the banks, respectively. Hence, most of the fair
value assets in our sample are classiﬁed as Level 2 assets.
Since Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 assets are the key independent variables in our regression anal-
yses, we provide some analyses of the time-series patterns of each level of the fair value assets over
the four years since the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis. Table 2, Panel C presents the means of these variables for
each ﬁscal year from 2008 to 2011. The mean Level 1, Level 2, and Level 3 assets per share are 3.16,
24.04, and 2.88, respectively, in 2008 and 3.74, 30.86, and 4.37, respectively, in 2011. Hence there
is a slight increase in banks’ holdings of Level 1 ﬁnancial instruments over our sample period. Like-
wise, banks’ Level 3 instruments also increased during the sample period, and banks’ Level 2 ﬁnancial
Table 1
Sample construction.
Steps Observations
Panel A: sample selection
All banks, i.e., ﬁrms in Global Industry Classiﬁcation Standard (GICS) Industry Groups 4010 or 4020 as
available from Compustat database
16,097
Retain all banks with ordinary shares listed on NYSE, AMEX, and NASDAQ at the ﬁscal quarter end date 10,324
Retain all banks for which Form 10-Q/10-K ﬁling dates are available 7738
Retain all banks with market capitalization (CRSP) and other control variables after the ﬁling date 7283
Eliminate observations that have studentized residuals greater than 2 in the estimation of Eq. (2) 6893
Exchange Observations
Panel B: sample composition by exchange listing
NYSE 1361
AMEX 190
NASDAQ 5342
Total 6893
Global Industry
Classiﬁcation Standard
Description Observations Mean market
capitalization ($b)
Median market
capitalization ($b)
Panel C: sample composition by industry classiﬁcation
401010 Commercial banks 4438 1.39 0.14
401020 Thrifts & Mortgage
ﬁnance
1206 0.44 0.10
4010 Traditional banks 5644 1.19 0.13
402010 Diversiﬁed ﬁnancial
services
209 29.03 1.46
402020 Consumer ﬁnance 108 5.54 1.00
402030 Capital markets 932 3.67 0.45
4020 Diversiﬁed
ﬁnancials
1249 8.08 0.62
Total 6893
Year Number of unique banks
Panel D: the number of unique banks and bank-quarter observations by years
2008 477
2009 464
2010 459
2011 445
This table provides details of our sample construction. Panel A shows the steps involved in the selection of the sample. Panel B
shows the distribution of observations by exchange listing. Panel C shows the distribution of observations by industry classi-
ﬁcation based on the Standard & Poor’s Global Industry Classiﬁcation Standard (GICS) Industry Grouping. Panel D shows the
number of unique banks in each sample year.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics.
Variable Mean StdDev P25 Median P75
Panel A: test variables (per share basis)
PRICE 13.25 15.87 5.23 10.26 17.76
NFVA 115.54 111.41 54.83 99.21 146.44
FVA1 3.09 20.28 0.00 0.06 0.76
FVA2 26.93 48.64 5.87 16.38 31.11
FVA3 3.60 33.11 0.00 0.04 0.74
NFVL 128.64 125.31 58.86 109.93 163.36
FVL12 3.98 37.65 0.00 0.00 0.12
FVL3 1.32 27.88 0.00 0.00 0.00
EPS 0.02 0.97 0.02 0.13 0.32
Variable Mean (%) StdDev (%) P25 (%) Median (%) P75 (%)
Panel B: relative size of fair value assets and liabilities
FVA/total assets 21.77 19.24 10.44 17.09 25.80
FVA1/total assets 2.41 8.02 0.00 0.05 0.76
FVA2/total assets 15.93 13.82 6.66 14.15 21.36
FVA3/total assets 3.97 15.51 0.00 0.03 0.61
FVLIAB/total liabilities 1.95 8.65 0.00 0.00 0.17
FVL12/total liabilities 2.01 10.06 0.00 0.00 0.11
FVL3/total liabilities 0.53 5.11 0.00 0.00 0.00
2008 2009 2010 2011
Panel C: the mean values of the test variables (per share basis) by time-series trend
PRICE 13.34 12.28 13.52 13.92
NFVA 119.35 120.20 111.37 110.87
FVA1 3.16 2.70 2.78 3.74
FVA2 24.04 26.69 26.34 30.86
FVA3 2.88 3.19 4.04 4.37
NFVL 129.77 132.42 124.40 127.81
FVL12 4.50 4.31 2.95 4.16
FVL3 0.47 0.73 2.09 2.04
EPS 0.10 0.08 0.08 0.18
Observations 1748 1768 1729 1648
This table provides descriptive statistics of the variables that are used in this study. Panel A shows the means, standard
deviations, and quartiles of our test variables on a per share basis. Panel B shows the relative size of fair value assets and
liabilities. Panel C presents the time-series trends of the test variables for our sample. Bank-year observations are sorted based
on ﬁscal year. PRC is the price immediately after the ﬁling date. FVA1 (FVA2, FVA3) is the fair values of Level 1 (Level 2, Level 3)
reported assets. FVL1 (FVL2, FVL3) is the fair values of Level 1 (Level 2, Level 3) reported liabilities. FVL12 represents the
combined fair values of Level 1 and Level 2 liabilities. NFVA (NFVL) is the net assets (liabilities) that are not marked at fair value.
NI is the ﬁrm’s earnings per share. There are 4751 observations in our sample.
Table 3
Correlation matrix.
PRICE FVA1 FVA2 FVA3 FVL12 FVL3
PRICE 1 0.45 0.29 0.01 0.12 0.02
FVA1 0.25 1 0.35 0.07 0.38 0.02
FVA2 0.36 0.06 1 0.10 0.78 0.02
FVA3 0.11 0.13 0.14 1 0.08 0.83
FVL12 0.27 0.29 0.16 0.32 1 0.04
FVL3 0.09 0.19 0.14 0.37 0.34 1
This table presents the correlations among the key variables used in our regression analyses. Pearson and Spearman correlations
are reported above and below the diagonal, respectively. Numbers in bold indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% level, two-tailed. See
Table 2 for variable deﬁnitions.
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instruments have increased signiﬁcantly. Finally, we note that banks, on average, report negative net
income in 2008 and 2009. However, our sample banks resume proﬁtability from 2010 onwards.
Table 3 presents the Pearson and Spearman correlations among the variables. The table indicates
that the correlation between PRICE and FVA3 is lower than the correlations between PRICE and FVA1
and between PRICE and FVA2. Speciﬁcally, PRICE has Pearson (Spearman) correlations of 0.45 (0.25),
0.29 (0.36) and 0.01 (0.11) with FVA1, FVA2, and FVA3, respectively. These correlations provide preli-
minary evidence that the market valuation of banks is positively associated with the amount of fair
value assets and that the association appears to be weaker for Level 3 assets than for Level 1 and Level
2 assets.
4. Empirical results
4.1. Pricing of fair value estimates reported under SFAS 157
Our paper examines how investors assess the pricing of banks’ fair value assets, where pricing
refers to the ability of the fair value asset amounts to reﬂect information relevant to investors. Follow-
ing Barth and Clinch (1998), we begin by using share price as a summary measure of information rel-
evant to investors and investigate the ability of recognized ﬁnancial statement amounts to explain this
measure, based on Eq. (1).
PRICEi;t ¼ b0 þ b1BEi;t þ b2EPSi;t þ ei;t; ð1Þ
where the dependent variable (PRICE) is the closing share price on the date immediately after the ﬁling
of the ﬁnancial reports, BE is the book value of equity, and EPS is the earnings per share. Book value of
equity and earnings are the explanatory variables in (1) and they constitute the summary measures of
information as reﬂected in ﬁnancial statement accounting numbers, whereas b0 and ei,t capture the
portion of price unexplained by BE and NI. Because we seek to determine whether the pricing of fair
value assets varies across the different levels under the SFAS 157 hierarchy, we partition BE as follows:
PRICEi;t ¼ b0 þ b1FVA1i;t þ b2FVA2i;t þ b3FVA3i;t þ b4NFVAi;t þ b5NFVLi;t þ b6FVL12i;t
þ b7FVL3i;t þ b8EPSi;t þ ei;t; ð2Þ
where FVA1 (FVA2, FVA3) are Level 1 (Level 2, Level 3) assets and NFVA (NFVL) is the net assets (liabil-
ities) not marked at fair value. Following Song et al. (2010), we combine Level 1 and Level 2 liabilities
(FVL12) separately from Level 3 liabilities (FVL3). EPS is the bank’s earnings per share. PRICE is the stock
price measured immediately after the 10-Q or 10-K ﬁling date bank i in quarter t. All variables are
deﬁned on a per share basis. The above regression speciﬁcation is applied for the regressions that
use the full sample, (i.e., with observations from 2008 to 2011), as well as for the regressions run
for each year in the sample. For all the regressions, we cluster the standard errors by banks and ﬁscal
quarters.
If investors consider the fair value assets of the banks to be of value, we would expect the coefﬁ-
cient on FVA1, FVA2, and FVA3 to be positive and signiﬁcantly different from zero. Given that both
prices and fair value assets have been scaled by the same number of outstanding shares, a coefﬁcient
of one suggests that investors price each dollar of a reported fair value asset at a dollar.9
Table 4 reports the regression results based on Eq. (2). Consistent with the results documented in
Song et al. (2010), we ﬁnd that there is a decline in the weight that investors placed on banks’ fair
value assets as we move across the three-level fair value hierarchy. Speciﬁcally, we ﬁnd that the coef-
ﬁcients on FVA1, FVA2, and FVA3 are 1.02 (t-statistic: 46.21), 0.96 (t-statistic: 42.32) and 0.87 (t-statis-
tic: 33.69), respectively. While the valuation coefﬁcient on FVA1 is not different from its theoretical
value of 1, the coefﬁcients on FVA2 and FVA3 are signiﬁcantly less than 1, implying that investors place
less weight on these types of fair value assets.
9 In theory, the coefﬁcient of one suggests that there is no mispricing. In practice, the regression coefﬁcients might differ from its
theoretical value of one due to various empirical issues as valuation models are affected by misspeciﬁcation and measurement
error problems.
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We also test for differences in the pricing of these assets by conducting F-tests of the differences in
the coefﬁcients across the fair value hierarchy. We ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient on FVA1 is signiﬁcantly
different from that of FVA3 (F-statistics: 74.98). Likewise, we also ﬁnd that the coefﬁcient on FVA2
is signiﬁcantly different from that of FVA3 (F-statistics: 45.90). The results show that investors price
mark-to-model assets (Level 3 estimates) signiﬁcantly lower than mark-to-market assets (Level 1
and Level 2 estimates). Hence, it appears that investors perceive signiﬁcant reliability concerns with
respect to the valuation of Level 3 instruments. As for liabilities, we ﬁnd both the coefﬁcients on
FVL12 and FVL3 are signiﬁcantly different from their theoretical value of 1. In addition, the valuation
on FVL3 is also signiﬁcantly different from the coefﬁcient on FVL12, consistent with the perception that
investors consider the pricing of Level 3 fair value liabilities to be understated.
We thus conclude that mark-to-model fair value assets based on unobservable inputs (Level 3
assets) are priced lower than fair value assets based on observable inputs (Level 2 assets) and
mark-to-market fair value assets (Level 1 assets). Given that mark-to-model assets are inherently less
liquid and carry higher information risk compared to mark-to-market assets, it appears that investors
are pricing these assets lower because of concerns about asset liquidity and information risk. It could
also be due to the fact that Level 3 inputs are unobservable and generated by the entity itself, whereas
Level 1 and Level 2 inputs are observable, because they are taken directly from the market or from
data adjusted for similar items traded in active markets. In the next section, we further investigate
time-series variation in investors’ pricing of these fair value estimates.
4.2. Time-series variation of the fair value estimates reported under SFAS 157
Table 5 reports the results of our tests when we run the regressions separately for each year from
2008 to 2011. This analysis allows us to examine whether there are signiﬁcant differences in the pric-
ing of the different levels of the fair value assets since the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis. It also enables us to
assess whether the changes differ between assets that are priced based on market-based inputs versus
those which are priced based on non-market-based inputs. We expect the deteriorating market
conditions in 2008 to have minimal impact on the pricing of Level 1 assets because these assets are
associated with high liquidity and low information risk. In contrast, the valuation of the less liquid
Level 2 and Level 3 assets are based on valuation models that might not have fully accounted for
Table 4
Pricing of net assets marked at fair value.
Coeff. t-stat F-stat (coeff. = 1) p-Value F-stat (coeff. = 1) p-Value
Intercept 0.80 3.00***
NFVA 0.90 40.54*** 104.11*** 0.00
FVA1 1.02 46.21*** 2.69 0.11
FVA2 0.96 42.32*** 20.03*** 0.00
FVA3 0.87 33.69*** 143.18*** 0.00
NFVL 0.92 39.09*** 56.71*** 0.00
FVL12 0.98 42.75*** 3.74** 0.05
FVL3 0.87 34.02*** 126.53*** 0.00
EPS 2.52 13.43***
Number of observations 6893
R-square 0.74
F-tests (F-stat)
FVA1 = FVA2 21.39***
FVA1 = FVA3 74.98***
FVA2 = FVA3 45.90***
FVL12 = FVL3 65.03***
This table presents the results of the regression analyses of how investors value net assets marked at fair value. The dependent
variable is PRICE, which is the price immediately after the ﬁling date. All other variables are deﬁned in Table 2.
⁄ Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% levels.
** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% levels.
*** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% levels.
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the increasing illiquidity in many asset markets. There could also be a lack of reliable models or input
parameters, as well as potential managerial biases, in the estimation of fair values when markets are
disorderly.
Table 5 shows that pricing across all types of fair value assets is affected to varying degrees during
the disorderly market conditions of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis. Speciﬁcally, the coefﬁcient on FVA1
assets is 0.96 (t-statistic: 16.06) in 2008. Thereafter, it improves to 1.07 (t-statistic: 28.05) in 2009,
to 1.04 (t-statistics: 51.27) in 2010, and to 1.00 (t-statistic: 33.38) in 2011. We observe similar trends
for the pricing of Level 2 assets. The coefﬁcient on FVA2 assets is 0.85 in 2008. Subsequently, the
valuation coefﬁcient on FVA2 assets increases to 0.96 (t-statistic: 26.30) in 2009, to 1.00 (t-statistic:
39.19) in 2010, and to 0.95 (t-statistics: 29.74) in 2011.
In contrast, we ﬁnd that Level 3 estimates are generally priced relatively lower by investors, even in
the aftermath of the 2008 ﬁnancial crisis. While there is a signiﬁcant improvement in investors’
perception of the pricing of Level 3 estimates in 2010 and 2011, these instruments continue to receive
a substantial valuation discount even after market stability was restored. Speciﬁcally, the coefﬁcient
on FVA3 is 0.79 (t-statistic: 11.68) for 2008 and 0.85 (t-statistic: 25.88) for 2009. Thereafter, the
coefﬁcient on FVA3 improves to 0.88 (t-statistic: 38.25) for 2010 and 0.88 (t-statistic: 26.38)
for 2011.
The F-tests of the statistical signiﬁcance of the differences in the pricing of the fair value estimates
produce some interesting results. In 2008 and 2009, the coefﬁcient on FVA3 is signiﬁcantly lower than
those coefﬁcients on FVA1 and FVA2. In 2010, the coefﬁcient on FVA3 is signiﬁcantly lower than the
coefﬁcient on FVA1. However, it is not signiﬁcantly different from the coefﬁcient on FVA2. Finally, in
2011, the coefﬁcient on FVA3 is not signiﬁcantly different from the coefﬁcients on FVA1 and FVA2. This
result suggests that the differences in the pricing of the three types of fair value estimates under the
fair value hierarchy may be dissipating over time.
While it is difﬁcult to pinpoint its exact reason(s), the trend bodes well for the inclusion of fair
value estimation in the ﬁnancial reporting process. The fair value estimation of Level 3 instruments
Table 5
Pricing of net assets marked at fair value by ﬁscal year.
2008 2009 2010 2011
(I) (II) (III) (IV)
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Intercept 2.03 3.36*** 0.69 1.30 0.28 0.63 0.65 1.41
NFVA 0.78 12.71*** 0.89 28.68*** 0.94 45.52*** 0.91 29.63***
FVA1 0.96 16.06*** 1.07 28.05*** 1.04 51.27*** 1.00 33.38***
FVA2 0.85 13.05*** 0.96 26.30*** 1.00 39.19*** 0.95 29.74***
FVA3 0.79 11.68*** 0.85 25.88*** 0.88 38.25*** 0.88 26.38***
NFVL 0.79 12.16*** 0.92 27.26*** 0.96 43.04*** 0.93 28.06***
FVL12 0.88 13.54*** 0.98 26.43*** 1.02 41.04*** 1.00 29.36***
FVL3 0.83 12.05*** 0.86 26.15*** 0.88 38.57*** 0.88 26.53***
EPS 2.38 9.06*** 2.32 7.94*** 3.09 5.69*** 3.31 5.99***
Number of
observations
1748 1768 1729 1648
Adjusted R-square 0.55 0.72 0.82 0.80
F-tests (F-stat)
FVA1 = FVA2 0.33 2.91* 3.65* 0.07
FVA1 = FVA3 12.78*** 8.89*** 4.19** 0.48
FVA2 = FVA3 21.67*** 6.58** 0.83 2.18
FVL12 = FVL3 4.15** 3.74** 3.03* 1.42
This table presents the results of the regression analyses of how investors’ pricing of net fair value assets changes across each of
the years in our sample period, from 2008 to 2011. The dependent variable is PRICE, which is the price immediately after the
ﬁling date. All other variables are deﬁned in Table 2.
* Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% levels.
** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% levels.
*** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% levels.
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Table 6
Cross-sectional analyses of Level 3 gains and losses.
Full sample 2008 2009 2010 2011
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Intercept 0.79 2.92*** 1.97 3.37*** 0.64 1.20 0.20 0.46 0.58 1.26
NFVA 0.90 40.31*** 0.78 12.78*** 0.89 28.31*** 0.94 45.16*** 0.91 29.63***
FVA1 1.02 46.05*** 0.96 16.11*** 1.07 27.96*** 1.04 51.14*** 1.00 33.36***
FVA2 0.95 42.11*** 0.85 13.09*** 0.96 26.08*** 1.00 39.1*** 0.95 29.75***
FVA3 0.87 31.77*** 0.79 11.77*** 0.85 25.62*** 0.88 37.06*** 0.88 26.47***
NFVL 0.92 38.87*** 0.79 12.2*** 0.92 26.93*** 0.96 42.74*** 0.93 28.06***
FVL12 0.98 42.57*** 0.88 13.6*** 0.98 26.23*** 1.02 40.97*** 1.00 29.37***
FVL3 0.87 32.12*** 0.82 12.19*** 0.86 25.9*** 0.88 37.4*** 0.88 26.62***
EPS 2.53 13.56*** 2.27 8.71*** 2.32 7.89*** 3.09 5.66*** 3.32 5.95***
LVL3GAINS 0.35 0.88 5.60 3.50*** 1.06 1.43 1.21 2.06** 1.44 1.99**
FVA3  LVL3GAINS 0.01 0.82 0.10 0.65 0.00 0.11 0.00 0.20 0.00 0.67
Number of observations 6893 1748 1768 1729 1648
Adjusted R-square 0.74 0.56 0.63 0.82 0.80
This table presents the results of the cross-sectional analyses of the effect of Level 3 gains and losses on how investors price fair value assets. The dependent variable is PRICE, which is the
price immediately after the ﬁling date. LVL3GAINS is a dummy variable that equals one for banks with Level 3 gains, and zero otherwise. All other variables are deﬁned in Table 2.
⁄ Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% levels.
** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% levels.
*** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% levels.
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Table 7
Cross-sectional analyses of capital adequacy based on market-based leverage ratio.
Full sample 2008 2009 2010 2011
(I) (II) (III) (IV) (V)
Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat Estimate t-stat
Intercept 1.28 3.96*** 2.73 5.85*** 0.87 2.42** 0.68 2.03** 1.30 3.66***
NFVA 0.89 35.48*** 0.76 24.22*** 0.89 49.33*** 0.93 65.72*** 0.90 43.62***
FVA1 1.00 43.83*** 0.92 21.25*** 1.06 46.42*** 1.03 66.59*** 0.99 50.08***
FVA2 0.94 37.16*** 0.82 25.20*** 0.93 47.18*** 0.98 63.35*** 0.94 44.09***
FVA3 0.86 30.35*** 0.77 21.55*** 0.85 39.00*** 0.88 48.79*** 0.87 37.86***
NFVL 0.92 34.36*** 0.77 23.37*** 0.91 47.46*** 0.95 64.21*** 0.92 42.06***
FVL12 0.96 37.76*** 0.85 25.39*** 0.95 46.80*** 1.00 58.04*** 0.98 43.57***
FVL3 0.86 30.67*** 0.82 13.48*** 0.85 35.65*** 0.88 47.87*** 0.87 37.27***
EPS 2.49 13.37*** 2.38 13.33*** 2.25 12.01*** 3.04 11.26*** 3.32 11.48***
LEVRATIO 2.59 4.76*** 3.03 3.31*** 1.69 2.24** 2.64 3.95*** 3.28 4.44***
NFVA  LEVRATIO 0.00 0.54 0.01 1.09 0.01 1.28 0.01 0.81 0.02 2.03**
FVA1  LEVRATIO 0.07 1.91* 0.02 0.37 0.21 2.31** 0.65 3.45*** 0.05 0.22
FVA2  LEVRATIO 0.10 5.24*** 0.10 3.45*** 0.16 6.88*** 0.09 4.14*** 0.06 2.69**
FVA3  LEVRATIO 0.06 0.28 0.11 0.62 0.11 0.34 0.20 0.85 0.17 0.49
Number of observations 6893 1748 1768 1729 1648
Adjusted R-square 0.74 0.56 0.73 0.83 0.80
This table presents the results of the cross-sectional analyses of the effect of the market measure of capital adequacy on how investors price fair value assets. The dependent variable is
PRICE, which is the price immediately after the ﬁling date. LEVRATIO is a dummy variable that equals one for banks with a leverage ratio equal to or above that of the median bank, and zero
otherwise. We deﬁne a bank’s leverage ratio as Tier 1 capital divided by total assets, where Tier 1 capital is equal to equity value plus reserves and minus intangible assets. All other
variables are deﬁned in Table 2.
* Indicate signiﬁcance at the 10% levels.
** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 5% levels.
*** Indicate signiﬁcance at the 1% levels.
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has always been a contentious issue because of the non-availability of readily available external inputs
to facilitate the estimation. Interestingly, this also means that it is the fair value estimation of these
instruments that might be most helpful to investors because managers are likely to have a signiﬁcant
information advantage when it comes to assessing their value. Hence one might view the above evi-
dence of the increasing reliance on Level 3 estimates over time as an indication that SFAS 157, perhaps
the most controversial accounting standard in recent times, is overcoming hurdles to become a stan-
dard that increases the usefulness of ﬁnancial reports.
4.3. Level 3 fair value gains and losses
In Hypothesis 2, we examine whether Level 3 fair value gains and losses inﬂuence investors’ pricing
of Level 3 estimates. To do so, we create a dummy variable LVL3GAINS that equals one for banks with
Level 3 gains, and zero otherwise. We interact LVL3GAINS with FVA3, as shown in Eq. (3) below:
PRICEi;t ¼ c0 þ c1FVA1i;t þ c2FVA2i;t þ c3FVA3i;t þ c4NFVAi;t þ c5NFVLi;t þ c6FVL12i;t
þ c7FVL3i;t þ c8EPSi;t þ c9LVL3GAINSi;t þ c10LVL3GAINS FVA3i;t þ ei;t : ð3Þ
Table 6 reports the results of estimating Eq. (3) for the full sample, as well as separately for each
year from 2008 to 2011. We expect the coefﬁcient on the interaction term LVL3GAINS xFVA3 to be
negative if investors discount the Level 3 asset estimates due to concerns that Level 3 gains have
been used to manage earnings and asset values upwards. Table 6 reveals that all the coefﬁcients
on LVL3GAINS  FVA3 are statistically insigniﬁcant at the conventional levels, suggesting that the
magnitude of fair value gains and losses does not lead investors to price Level 3 asset estimates dif-
ferently. One possible explanation for this result is that the discounting for the Level 3 asset esti-
mates is due to concerns about a general lack of reliability in the fair value estimation of illiquid
assets, as opposed to concerns about managers’ misuse of fair value estimates to inﬂate earnings
and asset values. The fact that managers have to explicitly report the audited details about the
changes in the value of Level 3 assets (and liabilities), combined with the added scrutiny of the fair
value estimation of illiquid assets since the implementation of SFAS 157 in 2008, could also have
made manipulation of Level 3 fair value estimation less viable as a managerial tool for boosting
earnings and asset values.
4.4. Effect of banks’ capital adequacy on the pricing of fair value assets
In this section, we report the results of testing Hypothesis 3, which examines the effect of capital
adequacy on the pricing of the fair value estimates. We measure capital adequacy using a market-
based measure of the leverage ratio. The leverage ratio is expressed as Tier 1 capital as a proportion
of total adjusted assets, where Tier 1 capital is deﬁned as the sum of capital and reserves minus intan-
gible assets. Then we create a dummy variable LEVRATIO that equals one for banks with a leverage
ratio equal to or above that of the median bank, and zero otherwise. Thereafter, we interact LEVRATIO
with FVA1, FVA2, FVA3, and NFVA as shown in Eq. (4) below.
PRICEi;t ¼ c0 þ c1FVA1i;t þ c2FVA2i;t þ c3FVA3i;t þ c4NFVAi;t þ c5NFVLi;t þ c6FVL12i;t
þ c7FVL3i;t þ c8EPSi;t þ c9LEVRATIOi;t þ c10LEVRATIO NFVAi;t þ c11LEVRATIO
 FVA1i;t þ c12LEVRATIO FVA2i;t þ c13LEVRATIO FVA3i;t þ ei;t : ð4Þ
To the extent that investors are more likely to discount the fair value of bank assets that face a
greater likelihood of a forced sale due to liquidity concerns, we expect the market pricing of fair value
assets to be higher for banks with higher capital adequacy. Hence the coefﬁcients on the interaction
terms of each level of fair value assets with LEVRATIO should be positive.
Table 7 reports the results of estimating Eq. (4). For the full sample, the coefﬁcients on FVA1  LEV-
RATIO and FVA2  LEVRATIO are positive and statistically signiﬁcant, whereas the coefﬁcient on
FVA3  LEVRATIO is not statistically signiﬁcant. These results indicate that higher capital adequacy
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improves the pricing of Level 1 and Level 2 assets, but not of Level 3 assets. The incremental effects of
capital adequacy on the pricing of Level 1 and Level 2 assets appear to be economically signiﬁcant.
Next, we examine how capital adequacy affects the pricing of the fair value assets over each of the
four years in our sample. We ﬁnd evidence that the coefﬁcient on FVA1  LEVRATIO is not statistically
signiﬁcant in 2008 and 2011. In 2009 and 2010, the coefﬁcient on FVA1  LEVRATIO is statistically sig-
niﬁcant. In contrast, the coefﬁcient on FVA2  LEVRATIO is statistically signiﬁcant in all sample years.
The results generally suggest that investors price Level 1 and Level 2 fair value estimates lower for
banks with capital adequacy below the median. Similar to our results with the full sample, we ﬁnd
that the market pricing of Level 3 estimates is not affected by cross-sectional variation in ﬁrms’ capital
adequacy ratios in each of the four years. While our third hypothesis does not specify whether capital
adequacy is likely to have a greater effect on the pricing of the different types of fair value estimates,
one might ﬁnd the lack of signiﬁcance that capital adequacy has on the pricing of Level 3 estimates to
be surprising. One possible reason, based on the fact that Level 3 assets are relatively less liquid than
Level 1 and Level 2 assets, is that banks are more likely to engage in ﬁre sales of their more liquid
assets and they need to raise additional capital. Consequently, investors apply a valuation discount
to ﬁrms’ Level 1 and Level 2 reported fair values in anticipation that these assets might be sold at
ﬁre-sale prices in the near future.10
Overall, our results in this section provide support that liquidity concerns is one factor that drives
investors’ pricing of the fair value reported by the banks. This ﬁnding is consistent with the analyt-
ical work by Allen and Carletti (2008) and Plantin et al. (2008). As noted earlier, these studies sug-
gest that fair value estimates that rely on market-based inputs are subject to greater pricing
variability other than the assets’ fundamentals in times of ﬁnancial crises. They also conclude that
fair value accounting might lead to undesirable economic consequences such as ﬁnancial contagion
and suboptimal contracting decision choices, as opposed to historical cost accounting in times of
ﬁnancial crisis. Our study, however, does not directly test this issue or empirically compare fair
value accounting to historical cost accounting. We leave it to future research to examine these
issues.
5. Conclusion
Our paper uses a combination of time-series and cross-sectional analyses to present evidence on
how investors price the fair value of assets reported by the banks under SFAS 157 since the 2008 ﬁnan-
cial crisis. An important feature of SFAS 157 is the three-level fair value hierarchy based on the inputs
available to estimate fair value. This feature enables us to examine how investors differentially price
mark-to-model andmark-to-market assets relative to the fair value estimates as reported by the banks.
Our empirical results suggest that while Level 3 fair values are priced lower than Level 1 and Level
2 fair values in our overall sample period from 2008 to 2011, interesting patterns are revealed when
the pricing is examined for each of the four years. In particular, we observe some dissipation in the
pricing differences of the three types of fair value estimates in the fair value hierarchy during our sam-
ple period. In the cross-section, we ﬁnd some evidence that investors discount fair values more for
banks with lower capital adequacy. This ﬁnding suggests that investors are concerned that banks with
lower capital adequacy might have to liquidate their assets at ﬁre-sale prices and not based on the
ﬁrms’ reported fair value estimates.
Overall, our paper contributes to the literature by addressing the question of whether there are
changes in investors’ perception of banks’ reported fair value estimates as realistically reﬂecting the
underlying value of the assets. Speciﬁcally, we compare and contrast settings when markets are dis-
orderly as opposed to when market conditions are stable. In addition, we also explore some of the fac-
tors that contribute to the disparity between the valuation by investors and the fair value estimates
that banks provide.
10 Since Level 3 fair values are already discounted by investors relative to Level 1 and 2 fair value measurements, our results thus
show that differences in the extent of capital adequacy across banks do not lead investors to apply an additional valuation discount
toward Level 3 measurements.
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Appendix A. Extract of 10-K report – fair value footnote
Note 15: fair value of assets and liabilities
SI FINANCIAL GROUP, INC.
NOTES TO CONSOLIDATED FINANCIAL STATEMENTS
DECEMBER 31, 2008
Assets and liabilities measured at fair value on a recurring basis
The following table presents the balances of assets measured at fair value on a recurring basis as of
December 31, 2008:
The following table shows a reconciliation of the beginning and ending balances for Level 3 assets:
(Dollars in thousands) Year Ended
December 31, 2008
Level 3 securities at beginning of year $ –
Transfers into Level 3 6641
Impairment charges included in net loss (16)
Net unrealized losses included in other comprehensive loss (1233)
Level 3 securities at end of year $ 5392
(Dollars
in
thousands)
Quoted
prices
in active
markets
for identical
assets
(Level 1)
Signiﬁcant
other
observable
inputs
(Level 2)
Signiﬁcant
unobservable
inputs
(Level 3)
Total
Available
for sale
securities
$ 300 $ 157,007 $ 5392 $ 162,699
Total assets
at fair
value
$ 300 $ 157,007 $ 5392 $ 162,699
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